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FLORIDA'S INVOLUNTARY AIDS TESTING STATUTES*
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS**
I. INTRODUCTION
N Florida legislative politics, nothing is ever carved in stone, least of
all statutes themselves. Few more striking examples are available
than the Florida Legislature's swift retreat from the AIDS' testing and
confidentiality laws it enacted with much self-congratulation and
proud rhetoric in 1988.2 Faced with immediate hostility from influen-
tial lobbies, the 1989 and 1990 Legislatures began carving out huge
exceptions to their new AIDS testing laws-in effect retreating from
the most basic policies underlying the 1988 law.' The 1988 statute was
substantially narrowed in scope 4 and a long list of exceptions was writ-
ten into it. By far the most controversial of these exceptions is a series
* © 1991 by Robert Craig Waters. All rights reserved.
Law Clerk, Justice Gerald Kogan, Florida Supreme Court; A.B., 1979, Brown Univer-
sity; J.D., 1986, University of Florida.
The author wishes to thank Yvonne Gsteiger of the staff of the Florida House of Representa-
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Supreme Court Librarian Joan Cannon and her staff-Jo Dowling, Joyce Elder, Jo Smyly, and
Linda Cole-for their tireless and uniformly cheerful research support.
1. AIDS is the acronym for acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a complex of oppor-
tunistic infections and malignancies caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIv). W.
MASTERS, V. JoHNsON & R. KOLoDNY, CRisis: HETrRosEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AoE oF AIDS
179-84 (1988). For general information on the medical and epidemiological effect of HIV infec-
tion in the United States and Florida, see 1 R. WATERS, AIDS & FLOIIDA LAW § 1.01-.09 (1989
& Supp. 111991).
2. The events surrounding the enactment of the 1988 omnibus AIDS act are recounted in
Waters, Florida's Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, 16 FIA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 441 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 Waters Article], which this Article partially updates. The complete legislative history sur-
rounding the enactment of the Act is reproduced in R. WATERS, supra note 1, apps. A & B.
3. See FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (Supp. 1990) (to be renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 381.004
(1991)). For a discussion of these exceptions generally, see R. WATERS, supra note 1, ch. 14 (1989
& Supp. III 1991).
4. Before 1989, it appeared that the statute applied to all AIDS-related medical records,
whatever their origin, including both "first-hand" test results and "second-hand" AIDS-related
information supplied by the patient or others. See FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (Supp. 1988). In 1989,
the Legislature narrowed the statute to apply exclusively to "first-hand" AIDS test results-not
"second-hand" AIDS-related information. Id. § 381.609 (1989). Thus, the confidentiality provi-
sions extended only to the actual process of being tested for HIV and no longer covered records
about actual treatment, symptoms, or information provided by the patient or others. See id. In
1991, the Legislature continued this trend by loosening the requirements regarding "informed
consent" before the administration of an HIV test. Ch. 91-297, 1991 Fla. Laws 2375.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
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of enactments authorizing involuntary or coercive AIDS testing of
Floridians under certain circumstances.6
The legislative decision to authorize involuntary or coercive AIDS
testing is all the more surprising when considered in light of the broad-
brush policy statements that resounded throughout the 1988 legislative
session. That year, legislators uniformly eschewed proposals for forced
testing in favor of programs to encourage voluntary testing. 7 The pri-
mary sponsor of the 1988 legislation told her colleagues that the em-
phasis on voluntary testing was designed to prevent "an atmosphere of
distrust, irrationality, or punitive sanctions, because we believe it
would force the disease underground." 8
Yet, only months later and continuing to the present, the Legislature
responded to political pressure by approving an unprecedented series
of involuntary testing statutes. 9 The sudden reversal is evident in pres-
ent statutory language, which has been rendered partially self-contra-
dictory. For example, the 1988 statement of legislative intent still on
the books argues that strong confidentiality laws are needed because
many members of the public are deterred from seeking such testing:
either they misunderstand the nature of the test, or they fear that test
results will be disclosed without their consent. 0 The 1988 Legislature
further stated that it intended for the public health to be served by
facilitating informed, voluntary, and confidential use of tests designed
to detect human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection."
The 1989 and 1990 Legislatures did not explain how this policy was
furthered by their decisions not only to authorize involuntary or coer-
cive AIDS testing but also to force disclosure of the test results. In-
deed, it appears that the Legislature itself has given members of the
public a profound reason both to "fear that test results will be dis-
closed without their consent" and to worry that AIDS testing will not
be "informed, voluntary, and confidential.' ' 2 The law itself now
works against these legislative goals, thus rendering part of the state-
ment of intent nonsensical.
This Article examines the structure and constitutional soundness of
Florida's new laws authorizing involuntary AIDS testing and forced
6. These statutes originated in separate bills approved in 1989 and 1990. See ch. 90-210,
1990 Fla. Laws 1583; ch. 90-292, 1990 Fla. Laws 2319; ch. 89-350, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233.
7. See R. WATERs, supra note 1, app. B (reproducing rejected proposals).
8. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 5-6 (Apr. 13, 1988) (com-
ments of Rep. Frankel, Dem., West Palm Beach).
9. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)-(11) (Supp. 1990).
10. Id. § 381.609(1).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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disclosure of test results. The Article begins with a general review of
relevant constitutional law applicable to this field, focusing on search
and seizure issues, privacy rights, and due process issues. The Article
then examines the 1989 and 1990 involuntary AIDS testing statutes in
light of the constitutional analysis." The statutes are divided into two
groups: 1) those authorizing involuntary AIDS tests only after a court
review, usually-but not always-as an adjunct to a criminal prosecu-
tion, and 2) those authorizing involuntary AIDS testing by certain
health care providers without further involvement of the state.
II. THE CONSTruTIONAL FRAMwoRK FOR ANALYSIS
In recent years, courts and legislatures have come under increasing
pressure to authorize forms of involuntary medical testing in a variety
of settings.'4 As a result, a body of case law is emerging with recogniz-
able trends. Recently, for example, great interest has been shown in
workplace testing for drug abuse, especially for workers whose impair-
ment might jeopardize the safety of others." The courts generally have
upheld these efforts.' 6 Even Congress has condoned the use of work-
place medical testing in certain limited circumstances, but only if test-
ing is used for fair and nondiscriminatory reasons. 7
However, the ever-rising numbers of AIDS cases' s have prompted a
few states to try to adapt these medical testing laws into a tool for
allaying fears caused by the still-spreading AIDS epidemic. In particu-
lar, state legislators have come under intense pressure from certain
groups, such as police, paramedics, and health care workers, whose
jobs involve close physical contact with strangers. These groups worry
that if any one of these strangers is unknowingly infected with HIV,
13. Statutes authorizing the Florida Department of Corrections and local jail officials to
establish policies for conducting involuntary AIDS tests under specific circumstances are beyond
the scope of this Article. See id. §§ 945.35, 951.27 (1989). Both of these statutes originated in the
1988 Legislature and have been analyzed earlier. See 1988 Waters Article, supra note 2, at 20-21.
Moreover, courts traditionally have shown great deference to the policy-making authority of
correctional officers, including the authority to test for AIDS. See, e.g., Haywood County v.
Hudson, 740 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1987).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
15. See infra note 37.
16. Id.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (Supp. 1991).
18. By April 30, 1991, Florida reported 15,726 cases of AIDS, including 423 pediatric cases.
R. WATERS, supra note 1, § 1.09, at 49 (Supp. I 1991) (reprinting FLA. DEP'T OF HRS, TE
FLORIDA AIDS/HIV SURVEu.xtCc REPORT (1991)). The State officially expects this figure to
more than double by 1993, when approximately 40,000 AIDS cases are expected in Florida. Id.
at 71 (reproducing Dep't of HRS interoffice memorandum from Charles S. Mahan, M.D., to
District Administrators (Oct. 22, 1990)). In late 1990, the State officially estimated that 120,000
Floridians were infected with HIV. Id.
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one of their own members might unknowingly become infected, too.' 9
The infection then could be transmitted unwittingly to family members
and loved ones.2° Thus, these workers have asserted a right to learn if a
stranger's blood or bodily fluids is infected with the virus.
Victims of sexual batteries are another group at risk of contracting
AIDS. Rape victims' advocates have argued that the victims of sexual
assaults have a natural right to know their attackers' HIV status. 2'
These groups and others have convinced several state legislatures, in-
cluding the one in Florida, that methods should exist by which a per-
son can be tested for HIV after exposing others to a significant risk of
catching the virus.
The human dimension of this problem is entirely understandable and
deserving of sympathy. The question of involuntary or coercive AIDS
testing, however, raises serious constitutional questions that cannot be
resolved based on sympathy. 22 Involuntarily taking someone's blood
for an AIDS test implicates some of the most fundamental human
rights protected by the state and federal constitutions.
A. The "Civil" Nature of Involuntary Testing Statutes
An important threshold issue is the exact nature of the statutes in
question-whether civil or criminal. In some instances, the methods of
19. The federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have documented instances in which
health-care and public-safety workers have become infected with HIV on the job. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION OF TRANsMIssIoN OF HUMAN IMMUNODE-
FICIENCY VIRus AND HEPATITIS B VIRus TO HEALTH-CARE AND PUBLIC-SAFETY WORKERs 4
(1989). The risk of transmission is slight, however, even if direct exposure occurs. One study
showed that less than one-half of one percent of exposed workers actually contracted HIV "via
needle stick or splashes to skin or mucous membranes [of] blood from patients known to be
HIV-infected." Id. The CDC estimates the risk of infection after direct "needlestick" exposure
to be about one-half of one percent. Id. at 2. The intense fear generated by exposure to HIV-
even though exposure is unlikely to lead to infection-may be explained by the fact that AIDS is
presently both incurable and apparently invariably fatal.
20. Worldwide, HIV is transmitted primarily by vaginal, heterosexual intercourse, even
though homosexual cases have predominated in. the United States. M. GUNDERSON, D. MAYO &
F. RHAmE, AIDS: TESTnO & PRIVACY 24 (1989) [hereinafter TEsTINo & PRIVACY]. Thus, a per-
son who becomes infected with HIV on the job could transmit the virus to a spouse during
sexual intercourse. Mothers also can transmit the virus to their infants, especially during preg-
nancy. See id. at 26.
21. See, e.g., Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 1989, at 14A, col. 1; State v. Doremus, 571 So. 2d
831 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the plight of a sexual battery victim whose assailant was HIV
infected); Zule v. State, 802 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (court found that a child was
infected with HIV when sodomized by a defendant who had the virus).
22. It is clear, however, that some courts have been strongly swayed by sympathy for the
person exposed to bodily fluids. In People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 1075, 529 N.Y.S.2d
429, 431 (Schoharie County Ct. 1988), for example, the court's conclusory opinion cited sympa-
thy as an important reason for granting a request for an involuntary AIDS test. The opinion in
Thomas is unsatisfying because of its failure to confront the obvious constitutional issues at
stake; other courts have confronted the issues. See Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
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analysis may vary depending upon whether a statute falls into one or
the other of these two broad categories.
Typically, the involuntary AIDS testing statutes are framed as civil
rather than criminal laws. They usually do not expressly or directly
attach any penalty to the discovery that the test subject is HIV-in-
fected. Rather, the statutes often provide for disclosure of test results
to both the test subject and the one who requested that the test be
conducted. 23
A close look at Florida law, however, reveals that some of the invol-
untary AIDS testing statutes may have hidden penalties. In some in-
stances court-ordered testing comes into play only as a result of a
criminal act or allegation, such as rape or battery. In such cases, a
court-ordered test may be used to bolster a prosecution based on any
one of Florida's new laws criminalizing the act of exposing others to a
risk of HIV infection.- Thus, the fact that a test has been conducted
may become a feature of the criminal trial and carry a hidden criminal
penalty.
Other hidden penalties are possible at sentencing. At least one Flor-
ida appellate court has found that a defendant's sentence may be en-
hanced where the defendant first tested positive for HIV shortly after
committing the crime in question. In that case, Cooper v. State,25 the
First District Court of Appeal said the defendant's gay lifestyle was a
sufficient reason for an aggravated sentence because he "knew or
should have known that he had been exposed to the AIDS virus."'26 In
other words, Cooper based the enhanced penalty on a "constructive
knowledge" rationale. 27
In light of Cooper, any involuntary testing statute may carry a hid-
den penalty if the test is adjunct to a criminal trial. Citing the prece-
dent of Cooper, a court would be justified in aggravating the
defendant's sentence based entirely on a positive test result obtained
under one of Florida's civil involuntary testing statutes. This especially
is true where the positive test result is combined with evidence of sex-
ual promiscuity, drug abuse, hemophilia, blood transfusions received
prior to 1985,28 or other factors that entail a risk of contracting HIV.
23. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 960.003 (Supp. 1990).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1989).
25. 539 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1989).
26. Id. at 511.
27. For criticism of Cooper's rationale, see R. WATmEs, supra note 1, § 10.18, at 75-76
(Supp. III 1991).
28. Blood screening for HIV infection was not conducted before 1985. TESTING & PRIVACY,
supra note 20, at 194.
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If the precedent in Cooper stands, it apparently is irrelevant that the
court-ordered test occurred after the crime.
A constitutional analysis, however, does not hinge on whether the
statutes are criminal or civil. Constitutional rights come into play in
both cases. 29 But the possibility of hidden penalties increases the need
for close judicial scrutiny.
B. Search and Seizure Issues
Perhaps the most pressing and complex issue the courts must resolve
in this context is the applicability of search and seizure law. On the
question of involuntary blood testing, the relevant federal precedent is
particularly murky. In large part, the confusion stems from the gradu-
ally changing philosophies that have dominated the United States Su-
preme Court since the 1950s. Opinions published by the more liberal
Warren Court, for instance, often are difficult to reconcile with those
of the more moderate Burger Court and the present and more conser-
vative Rehnquist Court. The high Court's position has changed partly
as a result of an obvious philosophical drift.
1. Probable Cause Plus vs. Special Needs
The constitutionality of intrusive testing measures turns on the
state's burden of proof that the test is needed. The standard used is
generally probable cause. However, earlier cases on the probable cause
standard seem to assume that medical tests on human subjects cannot
be compelled unless the state shows two factors: 1) probable cause that
material evidence will be found, plus 2) State interests that outweigh
the privacy rights and personal interests of the individual.3 0 Some com-
29. For example, the federal courts have held implicitly that a search is no less a search
simply because its purpose is civil and not punitive. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989). Similarly, Florida's right of privacy plainly is implicated even in nonpunitive at-
tempts to obtain private information about a person, especially AIDS-related information. Ras-
mussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). Likewise, there is no
question that due process concerns are present in both civil and criminal settings. See, e.g.,
South Fla. Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 101 Fla. 1351, 1358, 133 So. 334, 337 (1931)
(stating that due process protects privacy rights).
30. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767-72 (1966). The interests of the individual include the potential threat to the sus-
pect's health and the extent of the "intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal
privacy and bodily integrity." Winston, 470 U.S. at 761.
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mentators have called this a "probable cause plus" standard.3 In the
context of HIV testing, this standard would be difficult to meet. Most
of the involuntary testing statutes authorize forced testing merely be-
cause a victim or other person has been significantly exposed to body
fluids.3 2 There often is no suggestion whatsoever, much less probable
cause plus, that the test subject actually is HIV infected.
However, under an analysis that focuses on the existence of "special
needs," more recent cases have carved out exceptions to the earlier
case law establishing the probable cause plus standard.33 Once the gov-
ernment can show a special need for the evidence or information it
seeks, the court then applies a relaxed standard that asks simply
whether the public interests outweigh personal interests.3 4 Neither
probable cause nor any kind of individualized suspicion is an issue.
The question, then, is whether involuntary HIV testing falls within the
definition of a special need.
It is not particularly clear exactly what constitutes a special need or
in exactly what circumstances it is appropriate. In some instances, the
Supreme Court has sustained arguments for a special need that are not
particularly persuasive-only minimally plausible.35 Thus, the special
need analysis may well be an easy standard for the state to meet.
However, the recent trend to recognize special needs has not settled
the question of whether a relaxed standard of review will be applied to
HIV testing. The higher federal courts have not yet confronted the is-
sue. Also unsettled is whether particular kinds of involuntary testing
might be analyzed under a rationale different from both the probable
cause plus and the special needs standards-perhaps an intermediate
standard similar to the founded suspicion analysis used elsewhere in
search and seizure law to justify pat-down searches and other tempo-
rary detentions.3 6 Such an intermediate level of analysis might be ap-
propriate for involuntary HIV testing where significant exposure to
bodily fluids could be deemed to create founded suspicion justifying
the test.
The confusion is increased because involuntary HIV testing usually
is quite different from any of the other kinds of court-ordered medical
31. See, e.g., Morgan, The Problems of Testing for HIV in the Criminal Courts, JUDGES'
J., Spring 1990, at 22, 24.
32. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 960.003 (Supp. 1990).
33. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent in
Von Rabb is an analysis of the minimal persuasiveness of the State's arguments.
36. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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procedures previously authorized by the Supreme Court. 37 The proce-
dures authorizing involuntary HIV testing are unlike the workplace
drug-testing cases: HIV testing usually involves particular individuals
who have committed acts theoretically capable of transmitting HIV to
others, while workplace testing typically involves only a blind testing
program aimed at an entire group of people, none of whom personally
may be suspected of drug or alcohol abuse. Thus, the involuntary HIV
testing statutes allow an exercise of discretion about who will be tested,
while workplace drug and alcohol tests usually do not.38 Moreover,
HIV testing procedures usually are not intended to obtain evidence of
a crime, while many of the other involuntary testing procedures usually
are. On the face of the HIV testing statutes, the only purpose for the
test is to disclose the test results to the person who has been exposed to
bodily fluids.
In other words, HIV testing falls somewhere in an uncharted middle
ground lying between the two earlier kinds of mandatory testing cases.
The typical HIV testing statute involves a kind of particularized suspi-
cion falling short of probable cause and an absence of a direct criminal
penalty; it singles out specific individuals but does not directly attempt
to penalize them.
One other factual difference distinguishes involuntary HIV testing
from other court-ordered medical procedures. Unlike most other sim-
ple medical tests, HIV testing reveals medical information that may
have a devastating impact on individuals, their friends, and their fami-
lies. This impact may be psychological, social, and legal. Some courts
have noted that AIDS is the modern-day equivalent of leprosy, often
37. From the 1960s to the 1980s, these cases focused primarily on attempts to force particu-
lar individuals to undergo specific medical procedures to obtain evidence of a crime. See, e.g.,
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet thought to be evidence of a
crime); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood taken in order to determine sus-
pect's blood alcohol level).
As the war on workplace drug and alcohol abuse escalated in the late 1980s, however, the
Supreme Court increasingly confronted testing programs designed more to prevent substance
abuse than to detect crime. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602
(1989). Usually, whole groups were tested simultaneously without any suspicion that anyone was
abusing drugs or alcohol. While the tests might have led to prosecution if they detected evidence
of criminal activity, the programs really were nothing more than impersonal administrative pro-
cedures used by certain governmental employers to rout workplace drug and alcohol abuse. Most
importantly, their administration involved no discretionary acts, because all similarly situated
workers generally were being tested.
Some commentators suggest that the special needs analysis is appropriate only if the persons
administering the testing program have minimal discretion. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 31, at
24, 67. Accordingly, these commentators argue that a "probable cause plus" standard would
continue to apply to any other medical procedure that involves substantial discretion to single
out specific persons for testing, especially if criminal activity is suspected. Id.
38. See e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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resulting in discrimination and a loss of employment and privacy.39
The Florida Supreme Court itself has indicated that disclosure of
AIDS-related information implicates fundamental privacy rights. 40
National authorities, speaking through documents such as a presi-
dential report on AIDS4' and laws such as the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act,42 have agreed. They consistently have recognized that HIV
diseases are viewed with such widespread horror as to require special
laws prohibiting AIDS-related discrimination. The Florida Legislature,
too, has expressly found that those infected with HIV have suffered
and will continue to suffer from unfounded and irrational discrimina-
tion caused by fear of AIDS. 4 As a result, the Florida Legislature has
enacted special laws to curb discriminatory practices.44
The question posed by the unique status of HIV testing, then, is
whether a relaxed standard could ever be appropriate in the AIDS-test-
ing context. As Judge Mary Morgan of the San Francisco Municipal
Court has noted:
While it remains true that the mere drawing of blood is
"commonplace" and involves for most people "virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain" . . . it is the revelation of the HIV test results, even
to the defendant himself or herself, that potentially has far more dire
consequences.
... "The psychological impact of learning that one is seropositive
... has been compared to receiving a death sentence. '45
2. Case Law
Although Florida has little precedent in this area, an opinion from
an intermediate appellate court in California may prove persuasive in
Florida. In Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court,46 the California First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal confronted a statute authorizing forced HIV test-
39. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (citing
South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
40. Id.
41. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
EPIDEMIC (1988).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 126 (Supp. 1990).
43. FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1989).
44. Id.
45. See Morgan, supra note 31, at 24 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n.,
489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989); Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 213, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (Sup. Ct.
1988)).
46. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
1991]
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ing of persons who significantly exposed police and emergency workers
to bodily fluids. The specific case involved a woman who bit a deputy
deeply enough to draw blood. When the deputy exercised his rights
under the California statute, the woman challenged the forcible testing
on a variety of grounds, including the fourth amendment and Califor-
nia's express constitutional right of privacy. 47
On the fourth amendment issue, the Johnetta court engaged in an
extensive analysis of both the physical and the emotional impacts of
HIV infection, including scientific evidence that transmission through
saliva is only remotely possible and has never been proven to occur.4
The court nevertheless found a special need that justified forcible test-
ing. This special need rested in part on the fact that a probable cause
standard would never permit testing in those cases in which the test
subject's HIV status was unknown-the precise reason the statute was
enacted.49 Thus, law enforcement officers and emergency workers
would never be able to learn whether they had been exposed to HIV.
The court stated:
[Tihe governmental interests behind [the testing statute], including the
assaulted officer's fear that he or she has in fact been infected,
outweigh the psychological impact of the assailant's receipt of a
positive test for HIV.50
The Johnetta court also rejected the claim that forced testing violated
California's right of privacy. 51 On this point, the court found that the
State had demonstrated a compelling need and that the intrusion upon
the test subject's privacy rights was minimal.52
In an analysis of the Johnetta opinion, Judge Morgan suggested that
the "key issue is whether testing the defendant, as opposed to the vic-
tim, will further the governmental interest." ' "a She discussed five fac-
tors that courts should consider in determining whether a special need
exists for involuntary AIDS testing. First, a negative test result does
not necessarily mean the defendant is free of HIV or that the victim is
at no risk; persons infected with HIV remain negative for several
weeks after the initial infection, or sometimes much longer. 4 Second,
47. Id. at 1260, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69.
48. Id. at 1263-64, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70.
49. Id. at 1277, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
50. Id. at 1278, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
51. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 1.
52. 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1283, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
53. See Morgan, supra note 31, at 66 (emphasis in original).
54. Id.
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the defendant's test result could show a false negative, which will occur
in about one percent of all tests." Third, there is the possibility of a
false positive-a problem made more likely because some standard
HIV tests are deliberately made to be overly sensitive . 6 Fourth, even if
the defendant is HIV infected, scientific evidence shows that transmis-
sion is unlikely to occur.57 Fifth and last, the defendant may have been
exposed to HIV after the criminal attack on the victim. 8
Of the five factors, only the latter one is a true variable, in that it
asks the court to consider how much time has passed between the as-
sault and the court-ordered test. The greater the lapse of time, the
more possible it is that a defendant acquired HIV after the crime in
question or that the victim was exposed to HIV from some other
source.
The result of Johnetta is generally consistent with a few other opi-
nions that have confronted the issue, usually in a conclusory manner.59
Representative of these conclusory opinions is one by the New York
County Court in People v. Thomas.60 The Thomas court confronted a
state request to order HIV testing of a defendant convicted of at-
tempted rape. The evidence showed the defendant had raped and so-
domized a woman who afterward sought to know the defendant's HIV
status .61
The court granted the request, but cited no more binding precedent
than its belief that involuntary testing was "the intelligent[,] humane,
logical, and proper course of action under the circumstances." 62 The
Thomas court also broadly suggested in dicta that, if the defendant
tested positive for HIV, he later might be tried "for depraved indiffer-
ence murder" 63-a conclusion that potentially could raise far more se-
rious constitutional questions than the issues the court directly
confronted.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., People v. Durham, 146 Misc. 2d 913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1990); In re
Anonymous, 156 A.D.2d 1028, 549 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 766, 559
N.Y.S.2d 976, 559 N.E.2d 670 (1990); People v. Cook, 143 A.D.2d 486, 532 N.Y.S.2d 940
(App. Div. 1988), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 786, 536 N.Y.S.2d 746, 533 N.E.2d 676 (1988).
Other courts have refused to address similar issues for procedural reasons, e.g., Doe v. Hirsch,
731 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Shelvin v. Lykos, 741 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
60. 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Schoharie County Ct. 1988).
61. Id. at 1072-73, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
62. Id. at 1075, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
63. Id.
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These questions were more squarely addressed by a California Court
of Appeal in Barlow v. Superior Court." There, testing was not re-
quested for a civil purpose but for use as a means of obtaining evi-
dence of crime. In Barlow, the defendant had bitten two officers
during a parade, announced that he was gay, and warned that he had
AIDS. The officers then filed a probable cause affidavit requesting a
court-ordered HIV test "to show an intent to inflict great bodily in-
jury" on the officers. 6 The affidavit then recited that the test results
were needed "in order to charge the case at a proper level.' '66
Emphasizing the criminal nature of the proceeding, the Barlow court
denied the court-ordered test after it explicitly applied the probable
cause plus standard discussed above.67 However, the result reached in
Barlow was at least partly attributable to technical defects in the affi-
davit, which claimed the evidence was necessary to prove "intent." Be-
cause an HIV test will not disclose whether a defendant possessed
criminal intent, the affidavit was facially absurd.
3. Conclusions
If the testing cases show anything, it is that the question of involun-
tary HIV testing is far too new to draw any final conclusions. How-
ever, the cases at least suggest that a crucial issue is whether the results
of the HIV test will be used against a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing. If not, courts addressing this issue to date appear to apply the
relaxed special needs standard. If test results are sought as evidence for
a criminal prosecution, there is some authority that the probable cause
plus standard must be applied. However, until the higher appellate
courts address this question, everyone is left to guess which of the
competing standards should be applied.
C. Privacy Issues
Unlike most other states, Florida has an express right of privacy in
article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution." Based on this provi-
sion, the Florida Supreme Court has stated that attempts to gather
64. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987), review denied and Reporter of Deci-
sions directed not to publish this opinion in the Official Reports (May 26, 1987) (LEXIS,
LEXSEE 236 Cal. Rptr. 134).
65. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 137.
68. The privacy amendment provides: "Right of Privacy.-Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as other-
wise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
AIDS TESTING
AIDS-related information about a person implicate this "right to be let
alone.'' 69 Thus, the right is implicated whenever the state attempts to
conduct involuntary AIDS tests on persons whose HIV status other-
wise is unknown. 70
The Florida Supreme Court has not confronted this issue directly in
the context of AIDS-related testing, but the Court has addressed anal-
ogous problems. In the opinion In re T. W.,71 the Florida Supreme
Court suggested that the privacy amendment guarantees people the
right to take affirmative steps to control their own bodies, such as the
decision to end or continue a pregnancy. 72 Thus, if the State orders or
prohibits medical procedures and thereby prevents people from directly
controlling their own physical or medical destinies, a violation of pri-
vacy may occur. Conceivably, an involuntary AIDS test could consti-
tute the same type of infringement because it prevents the test subjects
from controlling their own destinies.
In other cases, the Florida Supreme Court has addressed another as-
pect of privacy-the right to prevent medical procedures that one does
not desire. In Public Health Trust v. Wons,"7 the court found that a
person has a privacy right to refuse a blood transfusion for religious
reasons even if that transfusion may be necessary to save that person's
life. Likewise, in the case In re Guardianship of Browning,74 the court
held that the right to privacy includes the right to direct in a living will
that life-prolonging procedures be terminated if the only result will be
to maintain oneself in a permanent vegetative state and if, without the
life-prolonging procedures, death is imminent. 75 By analogy, a Florida
court could conclude that an involuntary AIDS test violates the right
69. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
70. Another possible violation involves state-sponsored attempts to gather preexisting
AIDS-related information about a person. In Rasmussen, id. at 534, the court faced a case in
which a man alleged he had contracted HIV after receiving 51 units of donated blood. He sub-
poenaed records of the blood bank in an attempt to prove that one of the 51 donors had AIDS.
Id. With this evidence, the defendant hoped to show that he did not contract AIDS from some
other source and thus was not responsible for his infection. Agreeing that the subpoena should
be quashed based on the rules of civil procedure, the Rasmussen court then engaged in an exten-
sive discussion of the privacy issues at stake in the proceeding. Id. at 533-38. The court described
the defendant's request as little more than a "fishing expedition," id. at 538, and concluded that
disclosure of donor identities "implicates constitutionally protected privacy interests." Id. at
537.
71. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
72. Id. at 1192-93.
73. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
74. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
75. Id. Accord John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980), approving 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
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to decide what types of medical procedures will be performed on one's
own body.
Wons and Browning, however, are civil cases and their logic thus
may be less forceful in a purely criminal context. This possibility is
underscored by a 1982 constitutional amendment that requires all Flor-
ida constitutional search and seizure issues to be analyzed in conform-
ity with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment. 76 The Florida Supreme Court has strongly suggested that
this requirement supersedes the privacy amendment whenever tradi-
tional search and seizure principles are involved. 77 If so, the applicabil-
ity of article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution may diminish to
the extent that such search and seizure issues are involved. Because
Florida's involuntary testing statutes were framed as civil laws, how-
ever, it appears more likely that the privacy amendment will apply.
This is true even though a test might accompany a criminal trial, be-
cause an involuntary test is not directly being used to gather evidence
of a crime. The question then becomes the method of analyzing the
privacy interests of test subjects.
The analysis used in Florida privacy cases parallels federal equal
protection analysis: the State may infringe upon a privacy interest only
if it can establish a compelling state interest that is advanced through
the least intrusive means available.7 This is a strict standard that fre-
quently requires the invalidation of any statute that infringes upon a
valid privacy right. 79 While the State often can demonstrate a compel-
ling state interest for health-related legislation, the least intrusive
means prong is very difficult to meet. Any significant overbreadth will
be fatal to the statute, because it will demonstrate that the means cho-
sen were not the least intrusive ones. However, there clearly are in-
stances when the State can establish that public interests outweigh the
privacy rights of individuals °
It is conceivable that particular involuntary testing statutes could
pass muster under the compelling state interest standard. Indeed, the
Johnetta court applied this standard to conclude that civil testing for
HIV was permissible in certain contexts. Because Johnetta appears to
be the only state court applying a state privacy guarantee in this con-
76. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
77. See, e.g., Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988). See also Slobogin, State Adoption
of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA.
L. REv. 653 (1987).
78. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
79. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
80. See, e.g., Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989) (use of pen register following
court authorization constituted least intrusive means).
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text, its opinion may be highly persuasive in states like Florida that
have similar constitutional provisions.
D. Due Process Issues
The question of due process may also be a significant issue in some
types of involuntary AIDS testing cases. Two relevant circumstances
may implicate due process. First, due process can be violated when the
police use tactics so extreme or outrageous as to offend basic concepts
of liberty and justice. 81 Second, a due process issue can arise if a stat-
ute allows an infringement of rights without sufficient "process," such
as by denying a right to a fair hearing or by presuming guilt before a
defendant has been duly tried and found guilty. 82
1. Outrageous Police Conduct
Certain types of bodily searches may be so outrageous as to consti-
tute a violation of the procedural rights of the accused.
For instance, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
prohibits police from taking a suspect into custody and pumping his
stomach for evidence of narcotics.8 3 The case reaching this conclusion,
Rochin v. California, is somewhat dated and may be a historical odd-
ity.8 However, it at least suggests that a due process analysis might be
applicable to HIV testing whenever the government has failed to fol-
low the procedural requirements of testing statutes or has otherwise
engaged in outrageous conduct.
A Florida court might be inclined to reach a similar result based en-
tirely on the due process clause of the Florida Constitution. 5 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court has at least suggested this possibility in the case of
State v. Glosson," where police conduct giving an informant a cut of
81. See, e.g., State v. Glosson, 468 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
82. See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1990). A third due process issue might
be relevant to some kinds of HIV testing regulations. Under Florida law, due process requires
that legislation be rationally related to the legislative goals in question. State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d
1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986). However, this is a minimal standard that appears to require that legisla-
tion be facially irrational before it can be applied. Id. For the reasons discussed in the text, there
seems to be little doubt that the statutes discussed in this Article are at least minimally rational.
83. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
84. Today, there would be less need to rely on due process in reaching the Rochin conclu-
sions, because the fourth amendment itself now is applicable to the states. The opinion preceded
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, as noted by Justice Black
in his concurrence. Id. at 175.
85. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9. See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1990) (opinion
based entirely on state due process guarantee while disagreeing with federal case reaching oppo-
site result on similar issue).
86. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
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civil forfeitures associated with criminal trials of defendants he helped
apprehend was held violative of due process.8Y While some precedent
suggests that Glosson should be confined to its facts,8 8 the case none-
theless shows that the due process clause of the Florida Constitution is
a possible basis for challenging outrageous police actions, including
outrageous conduct associated with involuntary AIDS testing. At the
very least, the issue remains arguable under Florida case law.
2. Lack of Sufficient Process
A basic aspect of due process is the requirement that a person's basic
rights cannot be infringed without providing that person sufficient
"process." The question of what process is "due" often is one of de-
gree, but it nevertheless is clear that a person's rights cannot be taken
away without the State first affording that person an opportunity to be
heard after reasonable notice.89 Thus, a due process violation might
occur if a person is summarily forced to undergo an HIV test without
first being given the opportunity to challenge that action in a fair hear-
ing.
Another manifestation of the principle of due process is the rule that
an accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before
being condemned by the law. 90 The Florida courts have repeatedly
stated that due process requires that judgment not be made until guilt
is established in a proper adversarial hearing. 9' This case law reiterates
similar statements by the United States Supreme Court that guilt does
not exist until proven beyond a reasonable doubt.9 Any statute that
created a presumption of guilt before a proper conviction would run
afoul of due process.
Thus, due process may be infringed by any involuntary AIDS testing
statute that presumes the existence of any element of a crime before
conviction. Such a presumption might exist if a statute authorized an
involuntary AIDS test on a defendant who merely is accused of a crime
that theoretically put someone else at risk of contracting HIV. The
most likely example is a sexual battery claim. An actual sexual battery
clearly would put the victim at risk of contracting HIV, assuming the
defendant is infected. Yet, until the defendant actually is convicted,
87. Id. at 1085.
88. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 5588 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1991); State v. Mc-
Queen, 501 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
89. Mayflower Investment. Co. v. Brill, 137 Fla. 287, 188 So. 205 (1939).
90. State v. Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 1990).
91. State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491 (1940).
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
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due process forbids the law to presume that the crime has occurred. An
involuntary HIV testing statute thus arguably would violate due proc-
ess by authorizing testing of a defendant not yet convicted of the
crime.
III. COURT-ORDERED AIDS TESTnNG
Before the 1990 legislative session, Florida law favored involuntary
testing only in limited circumstances. Court-ordered testing was per-
mitted for persons arrested for prostitution or procuring, 9 for sexual
battery defendants only if blood was being tested for some other pur-
pose,94 and for certain persons who exposed law officers or emergency
workers to bodily fluids.95 The statute on law enforcement officers and
emergency workers was especially ambiguous; it was worded so that
testing conducted pursuant to its authority fell under the strict confi-
dentiality provisions that govern HIV testing generally. 96 As a result, it
was unlikely that the information obtained from such tests could be
used in any but the most extreme circumstances 7
In 1990, the Legislature responded to concerns raised by law en-
forcement officers, emergency workers, hospitals, and victims' rights
advocates by approving a package of laws that included new or re-
vamped involuntary testing statutes. The 1990 statutes constituted a
major retreat from the earlier policies of the 1988 Omnibus AIDS Act,
which generally had eschewed involuntary HIV testing and had guar-
anteed the privacy rights of persons believed to be infected." In the
section below, the present involuntary testing laws are examined in
light of the analyses set forth in the preceding section.
A. Prostitution and Procuring
For several years Florida law has authorized involuntary testing of
persons convicted of prostitution or procuring. Such persons must sub-
mit to screening for sexually transmissible diseases-including HIV in-
fection-under the direction of the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (HRS). They also must undergo any appropri-
ate counseling and therapy. If the person is infected with a sexually
transmissible disease, that information can be released to the court, to
HRS, or to other state agencies for appropriate action. 99
93. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(3) (1989).
94. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)6.
95. Id. § 796.08(7).
96. Id. § 384.29.
97. See id. (listing limited circumstances when disclosure would be allowed).
98. See 1988 Waters Article, supra note 2.
99. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(3) (1989).
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Although the involuntary testing authorized by this statute is adjunct
to a criminal trial, it nevertheless is civil in character. This is so be-
cause testing occurs only upon conviction and, at least on the face of
the statute, does not result in an increased penalty to the defendant.
Thus, the present state of the case law suggests such testing can be
analyzed under the less rigorous special needs standard. In this con-
text, it seems likely the state can demonstrate a special need to test
persons convicted of prostitution and procuring simply because of the
state's broad powers to protect the public health.'0 Florida law has
long recognized that the state's police power includes authority to leg-
islate in behalf of public health. 0'
A different problem might arise, however, if the test result were used
to aggravate the defendant's sentence under the rationale announced in
Cooper.1°2 This might occur, for example, if the judge ordered testing
and reviewed the test results after conviction but before imposing sen-
tence. 03 In such instances, the rationale of Barlow'04 might be more
persuasive. That is, the propriety of a court-ordered test would be
gauged under the probable cause plus analysis.
Even if the stricter probable cause plus standard were applied, how-
ever, it is still not clear the state would lose its case. Conviction for an
act of prostitution or procuring might be deemed sufficient by itself to
establish probable cause of being infected with a sexually transmissible
disease. Moreover, any due process concerns might be eliminated by
the express requirement that conviction must occur before testing is
ordered. The State also would be able to demonstrate a strong interest
in conducting such tests to protect the public health, and a court might
be inclined to find that this need outweighs the interests of the individ-
ual.
By the same token, the State also may be able to prevail against any
claim that the statute infringes upon either privacy or due process. The
State's interest in protecting the public health doubtlessly is compel-
ling; the statute could be deemed to employ the least intrusive means,
because HIV testing is the only way to determine if a person actually is
infected. Due process also would be satisfied by the requirement of
100. Accord Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990).
101. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So. 2d 483 (1947).
102. Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla.
1989).
103. Under the terms of section 796.08(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), the court is granted
authority to review test results "to enforce the provisions of this chapter."
104. Barlow v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987), review
denied and Reporter of Decisions directed not to publish this opinion in the Official Reports
(May 26, 1987) (LEXIS, LEXSEE 236 Cal. Rptr. 134).
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prior conviction for prostitution or procuring, except in those situa-
tions where testing was conducted in an outrageous manner that itself
violated due process.
B. Persons Who Injure Law Enforcement Officers
and Emergency Workers
In a major revamping of prior law, the 1990 Legislature broadened
an existing statute that had authorized court-ordered HIV tests for per-
sons who significantly exposed certain public employees to bodily
fluids. The new statute provides:
The department [of HRS] or its authorized representatives may
examine or cause to be examined any person or inmate who injures
an officer as defined in s. 943.10(14),101 a firefighter, or a paramedic
or emergency medical technician acting within the scope of
employment. Evidence of injury and a statement by a licensed
physician that the nature of the injury is such as to result in the
transmission of a disease covered by this act shall constitute probable
cause for issuance of a warrant duly authorized by a court of
competent jurisdiction.'°0
This statute differs in several significant ways from the statute re-
garding prostitution and procuring. First, testing is done whether or
not the test subject has been convicted of any crime. Second, the stat-
ute creates its own standard of probable cause that asks whether the
injury in question was a kind that would "result in the transmission"
of diseases such as AIDS.
These features contrast sharply with the prostitution and procuring
statute. By adopting an express probable cause standard, the Legisla-
ture appears to have eschewed the less strict special needs test-even in
those circumstances in which it might reasonably be applied. Thus, the
state may have obligated itself to meet a heightened standard of proof
that the federal courts themselves might not have imposed. Whether
this feature of the statute was deliberate or unwitting is not evident; it
is, nevertheless, what the statute does.
Indeed, the statutory definition of probable cause for law enforce-
ment officers and emergency workers is significantly more severe than
the standard used in analogous statutes of other states, such as Califor-
105. This encompasses "any person employed or appointed as a full-time, part-time, or aux-
iliary law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer." FLA.
STAT. § 943.10(14) (1989). See also id. § 943.10(i)-(3), (6), (8)-(9) (defining various types of
officers).
106. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
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nia.'07 On its face, the statute only authorizes testing if "the nature of
the injury is such as to result in the transmission of a disease covered
by this act." l01 This is definite cause-and-effect language.
What the statute omits is significant. The statute does not say that
every test subject is assumed to be infected with a communicable dis-
ease, nor does it say that probable cause exists whenever there is a
likelihood that bodily fluids were transmitted. Rather, the statute says
the nature of the injury must be "such as to result" in transmission of
certain diseases. Obviously, transmission cannot occur if the test sub-
ject has no communicable disease. Thus, the statute appears to require
a physician's affidavit to establish probable cause that the person to be
tested is actually infected. Otherwise, there logically cannot be proba-
ble cause that transmission has resulted from the injury.
Certainly, this definition of probable cause will not always prohibit
a court-ordered test. Probable cause might be found under this stan-
dard, for example, if test subjects said they were infected-something
that sometimes occurs in cases of this type. 109 Similarly, probable cause
might be found for persons previously convicted of crimes that involve
a risk of becoming infected, such as prostitution or procuring. Proba-
ble cause also might be found because the test subject previously tested
positive for HIV.
However, the statute appears to prohibit court-ordered testing if the
physician's affidavit establishes only an exposure to bodily fluids or
blood. This conclusion is emphasized by contrasting Florida's statute
with its California counterpart, which only requires "probable cause
• ..to believe that a possible transfer of blood, saliva, semen, or other
bodily fluid took place between the defendant . . . and the peace offi-
cer."110 Unlike California's statute, which was upheld in Johnetta,
Florida's testing statute requires probable cause that the injury was
"such as to result in transmission of a disease." The contrast between
these two statutes strongly suggests that Florida intended to make its
probable cause standard far stricter than California's.
The remaining question is whether this statute will pass constitu-
tional muster. Again, applicable case law is sparse. One thing, how-
107. See Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Barlow v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987),
review denied and Reporter of Decisions directed not to publish this opinion in the Official
Reports (May 26, 1987) (LEXIS, LEXSEE 236 Cal. Rptr. 134). In Barlow, however, no proba-
ble cause was found in part because the police affidavit inartfully stated that a mandatory test
would disclose evidence of the test subject's "intent to kill (those bitten)" or an "intent to inflict
great bodily injury." Id. at 136. Obviously, science has not yet devised a blood test that can
detect criminal intent.
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1989).
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ever, seems clear: to the extent that a special needs standard may be
deemed appropriate in this context, the statute unquestionably is con-
stitutional. This is because the statute's express requirement of proba-
ble cause is far stricter than the special needs analysis used in federal
case law. As noted before, the early case law suggests that the special
needs standard is applicable whenever involuntary testing is not meant
to obtain evidence of a crime.
If a probable cause plus standard is chosen by the courts, however,
the statute stands on less firm footing. On its face, the statute merely
requires probable cause. It does not mandate that the State's interest
be weighed against the individual's privacy interests. Thus, if a court
were inclined to apply the probable cause plus standard, it also might
be inclined either to strike the statute as facially unconstitutional or to
read a requirement into the statute that the State's interests must be
weighed against the rights of the individual.
A due process challenge to this statute also could be raised. For ex-
ample, the statute apparently contemplates only an ex parte"'l hearing
in which a warrant is issued to forcibly test a person for HIV. The
statute makes no provision for an adversarial proceeding. This may
not be sufficient process under the state or the federal constitutions.
While ex parte proceedings may be appropriate in other contexts, it
is difficult to imagine why one is essential here, absent a showing that
the test subject is likely to flee. The State certainly cannot claim that
an adversarial hearing somehow will allow test subjects to alter their
own blood so that it cannot be tested properly for HIV. If the blood
was HIV-positive at the time of the injury, it will remain HIV-positive
if a little time is allowed for a proper adversarial hearing. Thus, a war-
rant issued in an ex parte hearing could be subject to a due process
challenge.
Florida privacy law may pose a much more difficult problem for this
statute. All AIDS-related information about specific persons is entitled
to protection under article I, section 23 of the Florida constitutionY.2
Thus, the State must demonstrate a compelling state interest achieved
by the least intrusive means before it can forcibly gather AIDS-related
information through an involuntary HIV test. While protecting the
health of public employees unquestionably is a compelling state inter-
est, it is not clear how this particular testing statute actually advances
that objective.
11. "Ex parte" means a judicial function taken at the instance and for the benefit of only
one party, without notice to or contesting by persons adversely interested. BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
112. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
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By its own terms, the statute limits the disclosure of involuntary test
results exclusively to those situations in which "the information is
medically necessary to determine the course of treatment for the in-
jured employee."" 3 The only conceivable instance in which it might be
medically necessary to test a person who has exposed someone else to
bodily fluids is when some kind of treatment exists to reduce the possi-
bility that exposure to disease will advance into a full-fledged infec-
tion. For example, penicillin treatments will effectively treat someone
who has been infected with syphilis. By analogy, then, if one is ex-
posed to bodily fluids, testing the source of those fluids for HIV would
be medically necessary only if an effective treatment for HIV infection
exists.
It thus is highly significant that the medical necessity clause was
written into the statute at a time when much interest was generated by
reports that the drug zidovudine (also called Azidothymidine or AZT)
may prevent infection if administered promptly after exposure to HIV.
Although there is no proof that such treatment works, the practice has
been encouraged by some health care providers because of a general
belief that zidovudine therapy is better than nothing. Indeed, the same
bill that added the medical necessity clause to the statute also expressly
ordered HRS to conduct a study on the prophylactic use of zidovu-
dine." 4 Thus, it is both reasonable and logical to conclude that the
medical necessity clause actually is referring to zidovudine therapy-or
some future equivalent.
The HRS study ordered by the Legislature was released in March
1991 and casts extreme doubt on the belief that zidovudine serves any
medical purpose whatsoever, much less that it constitutes a medical
necessity. According to this study, "It]he use of zidovudine as a post-
exposure treatment to prevent HIV infection is questionable."" 5 To
support this conclusion, the study noted that articles have appeared in
the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine documenting in-
stances in which zidovudine therapy completely failed to prevent HIV
infection after exposure."16
113. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(7)(b) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, "treatment" is limited to pharmacological methods of preventing HIV infection from
developing into AIDS. This construction is consistent with apparent legislative intent. See infra
text accompanying note 114.
114. Ch. 90-292, § 7, 1990 FLA. LAWS 2319, 2327.
115. FLA. DEP'T oF HRS, REPORT ON A SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ExPosuRES OF MEDICAL PER-
SONNEL TO BLOOD & INFECTIOUS BODY FLUIDS 12-13 (Mar. 1991).
116. Id. The HRS study went on to note'that almost half of all persons using this postexpo-
sure therapy in Florida reported unpleasant side effects such as nausea, vomiting, and insomnia.
Perhaps the most surprising finding, however, was that only 1.4% of all Florida health care
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These official findings strongly suggest that zidovudine is ineffective
as a means of preventing HIV infection. Unless this tentative conclu-
sion is refuted, it is difficult to imagine that a court-ordered HIV test
would be permissible under this interpretation of the statute's medical
necessity clause. Testing someone else for AIDS is unlikely to reveal
any information "medically necessary to determine the course of treat-
ment for the injured employee""' 7 if no such treatment exists.
These facts suggest the statute was poorly drafted, because there ap-
pear to be other compelling reasons that could justify testing in this
context. In rape victims' legislation, for example, the 1990 Legislature
identified a goal of alleviating the emotional anguish of those persons
potentially exposed to HIV. Public workers potentially exposed to HIV
unquestionably suffer a similar anguish. Similarly, the State legiti-
mately might claim an interest in informing public workers that they
have been exposed so that the workers, in turn, can take precautions to
prevent exposing others to the same risk in their personal and sexual
lives.
However, these goals are excluded from this particular statute be-
cause it names only one instance in which testing is allowed. 1 8 The
Legislature thereby restricted the statute to a single compelling need-a
need consisting of a medical necessity that the State's own health
agency called questionable. As a result, the statute appears to be un-
constitutional under Florida's right of privacy, because the statutory
compelling need is not realistic.
C. Sexual Battery Defendants
The 1989 Florida Legislature approved a statute giving sexual bat-
tery victims a limited right of access to AIDS-related information
about their assailants. The statute allows:
the performance of an HIV test upon a defendant pursuant to the
victim's request in a prosecution for any type of sexual battery where
a blood sample is taken from the defendant voluntarily or pursuant
to court order for any purpose . . . ; provided, however, that the
results of any HIV test performed shall be disclosed solely to the
victim and the defendant .... 9
Importantly, this statute does not itself authorize court-ordered
drawing of blood. Testing is conducted only if blood is obtained for
workers significantly exposed to HIV infection bothered to use zidovudine therapy at all. Based
on these findings, HRS reached the lukewarm conclusion that zidovudine therapy should "be
further evaluated." Id.
117. FLA. STAT. § 796.08(7)(b) (Supp. 1990).
118. Id. In statutory construction, the mention of one thing excludes all others. Ideal Farms
Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So. 2d 234 (1944).
119. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)6 (1989).
1991]
392 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19:369
some other lawful purpose. One significant feature of the above lan-
guage is that it authorizes testing of a defendant accused of any sexual
battery offense, but this term is not defined. In addition, there is no
requirement that the act in question actually involve an exchange of
bodily fluids. ,20
In 1990, at the urging of Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth
and others, the Florida Legislature significantly broadened this field of
law when it approved a new victims' rights statute for victims of sexual
attacks. The new statute's general effect is to authorize court-ordered
HIV tests of persons accused of a sexual battery offense and disclosure
of test results to victims. In its statement of intent, the Legislature
found that victims were entitled to know their assailants' HIV status.
The statute further stated that coerced AIDS testing was needed both
to prevent unnecessary emotional anguish and because early treatment
of HIV infection is medically desirable for both victim and assailant. 2 '
The early diagnosis language literally is true, but it suggests a mis-
leading conclusion. Early diagnosis may be important, but a physician
cannot diagnose the victim simply by testing the defendant. A positive
test of blood taken from a defendant will disclose only a possibility of
infection that later must be confirmed or disproved by tests on the vic-
tim. Thus, the only actual medical benefit of testing the defendant is to
disclose whether this possibility exists-and to engage in experimental
prophylaxis with zidovudine or other drugs that, as discussed above,
have not been proven effective.
The sexual battery statute has a number of features that set it apart
from the involuntary testing provisions discussed earlier in this Article.
The first substantive section provides simply that any person charged
with a sexual offense proscribed in chapter 794'2 or in section
800.04,'2 Florida Statutes, can be tested by court order. The request
can be made either by the victim, the victim's guardian, or, if the vic-
120. This statute also has been implemented by agency rule. FLA. ADmI. CODE ANN. r. 10D-
93.068(5)(i) (1990).
121. FLA. STAT. § 960.003(1) (Supp. 1990). The statement of intent says in pertinent part:
The Legislature finds that a victim of a sexual offense is entitled to know at the earli-
est possible opportunity whether the person charged with the offense has tested posi-
tive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. The Legislature finds that to
deny victims access to HIV test results causes unnecessary mental anguish in persons
who have already suffered trauma. The Legislature further finds that since medical
science now recognizes that early diagnosis is a critical factor in the treatment of HIV
infection, both the victim and the person charged with the offense benefit from
prompt disclosure of test results. The Legislature finds that HIV test results can be
disclosed to the victim of a sexual offense while confidentiality is protected in other
respects.
122. Chapter 794 deals with sexual battery offenses. FLA. STAT. ch. 794 (1989).
123. Section 800.04 prohibits lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the pres-
ence of a child. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1989).
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tim is a child, the victim's parent or legal guardian. Once a request is
properly made, the court cannot deny it. 124
One important proviso must be met, however, before testing can be
authorized: the offense must be one that involves transmission of bod-
ily fluids from one person to another. 12 This proviso could prove to be
a significant point of contention whenever a victim requests an AIDS
test. Wherever possible, defendants will challenge the request on
grounds that no bodily fluids were exchanged. The statute fails to spec-
ify who has the burden of proof on this question and what types of
evidence will suffice to meet the burden. 126 Presumably, this is a matter
the Legislature has left to the courts.
Significantly, the statute also states that an HIV test result obtained
pursuant to the statute is inadmissible in any criminal proceeding aris-
ing out of the alleged sexual offense. 127 Thus, the test result may not be
used either in determining the guilt of the accused or in determining
the sentence to be imposed. The effect would be to prohibit a depar-
ture sentence of the type given in Cooper'2  based on any test result
conducted under the 1990 victims' rights legislation. However, for the
reasons noted earlier, a court still might impose a departure sentence if
there is evidence that defendants knew they had put themselves at risk
of contracting HIV through promiscuity, drug abuse, or similar activi-
ties, but only if Cooper remains good law.
On the question of due process, both of the rape victim statutes de-
scribed above share a common problem. The fact that these statutes
authorize testing of one merely accused of a sexual battery offense ef-
fectively presumes guilt for purposes of conducting the HIV test. If the
request is properly made, testing must occur whether or not the defen-
dant later can be proven guilty. Even a frivolous charge of sexual bat-
tery thus can result in a court-ordered HIV test; and the trial court has
no discretion to refuse the test even if it believes the charges are
groundless. This in itself may constitute a violation of due process un-
der either the federal or the Florida constitutions.
However, any court deciding a due process challenge is likely to be
influenced by the practical problems embodied in both statutes. Many
people are raped every year. After the defendants in those cases are
charged, years may pass before a conviction is obtained. During this
time, the victim is left to anguish over the possibility of HIV infection.
124. FLA. STAT. § 960.003(2) (Supp. 1990).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla.
1989).
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These worries could interfere with home and family life, because the
victim might feel obliged to take measures to prevent spreading this
"theoretical" HIV infection to loved ones. Some courts may conclude
that the needs of the victim outweigh the possible due process prob-
lems of this statute and that no other reasonable means exist to meet
the victim's needs.
This conclusion may be underscored when the statutes are viewed in
light of Florida's privacy amendment.'2 The legislative statement of
intent expressly identifies two goals the 1990 Legislature hoped to
achieve: (1) alleviating the mental anguish of rape victims, and (2) al-
lowing for early diagnosis. Curiously, the Legislature omitted one
commonly cited goal-the desire to let victims adjust their personal
and sexual lives to avoid exposing loved ones to any disease they may
have contracted as crime victims. However, unlike the statute concern-
ing law enforcement officers and health care workers, the sexual bat-
tery statute's wording does not directly exclude other possible
legislative goals. In addition, the courts are likely to conclude that the
1989 rape victim statute shares the same goals.
All of these goals almost certainly constitute compelling state inter-
ests under Florida's privacy analysis. The question is whether this par-
ticular statute actually advances the State's goals and, if so, whether it
does so through the least intrusive means. Knowledge that a defendant
is uninfected with HIV unquestionably would alleviate a crime victim's
anguish. 30 Similarly, knowledge that a defendant carried the virus
would allow crime victims to make adjustments in their personal and
sexual lives to avoid any possibility of infecting others. 3' Thus, at least
some of the conceivable goals for this statute appear to be advanced by
it.
The last part of the analysis is whether the statute employs the least
intrusive means. One way of approaching this question is to ask
whether any other means exist to accomplish the State's goals. Here, it
is hard to conceive of any. There is no other way to determine a defen-
dant's HIV status other than through a blood test, at least until some
less intrusive method is developed by medical science. Moreover, both
the 198932 and the 199033 statutes contain guarantees of confidential-
ity. Thus, a court may find that the least intrusive means has been
129. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
130. Accord Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1990).
131. Accord id.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(g) (1989).
133. FLA. STAT. § 960.003(3), (4) (Supp. 1990).
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provided. One critical question will be how well the State enforces the
statutory guarantee of confidentiality.
As noted above, however, the State's interest in conducting a court-
ordered test may become less compelling as time passes between the
time of the assault and the time of the test. This is a real possibility
under two other provisions of the 1990 statute. One portion of the stat-
ute authorizes testing after conviction if the victim's preconviction re-
quest for an involuntary test was not honored.3 4 The statute
establishes no time limit for making the second request; the lapse of
time thus could be lengthy in some situations. If so, strong doubt can,
be raised about the value of information the test will disclose and
about whether the State's interest remains compelling if the test result
is not likely to reveal useful information.
One other provision of the statute authorizes release of the results of
HIV tests voluntarily taken by certain inmates or involuntarily per-
formed on them by jail officials pursuant to other applicable laws.' A
similar provision applies to county and municipal jails. 36 No time limit
of any kind is imposed. The request can be made at any time during
the offender's incarceration, even if it lasts for decades. Thus, courts
may be requested to determine whether sufficient time has passed to
render the State's interest less significant than the inmate's personal
rights of privacy. Indeed, with the frequency of AIDS cases in prison,
there is an ever-present possibility that an inmate may have acquired
134. Id. § 960.003(4). The statute provides:
If, for any reason, the testing requested under subsection (2) [providing for preconvic-
tion testing] has not been undertaken, then upon request of the victim or the victim's
legal guardian, or the parent or legal guardian of the victim if the victim is a minor,
the court shall order the offender to undergo HIV testing following conviction. The
testing shall be performed under the direction of the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, and the results shall be disclosed in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (3). The test results shall not be disclosed to any other person except as
expressly authorized by law or court order.
(emphasis added).
135. Id. § 960.003(6). The statute provides:
In any case in which a person convicted of a sexual offense described in subsection (2)
has not been tested [before conviction], but undergoes HIV testing during his incarcer-
ation, the results of the initial HIV testing shall be disclosed to the victim or the vic-
tim's legal guardian, or to the parent or legal guardian of the victim if the victim is a
minor, upon request.
136. Id. § 951.27(2). The statute provides:
[Ulpon request of the victim or the victim's legal guardian, or the parent or legal
guardian of the victim if the victim is a minor, the results of any HIV test performed
on an inmate who has been arrested for any sexual offense involving oral, anal, or
vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, shall be disclosed
to the victim or the victim's legal guardian, or to the parent or legal guardian of the
victim if the victim is a minor.
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HIV after committing the crime. As a result, the passage of time may
render the state's interest not sufficiently compelling.
On the question of search and seizure law, the two rape victim stat-
utes appear to withstand a special needs analysis. Here, the special
needs are the legislative goals of alleviating the anguish of the victim
and allowing the victim to take appropriate actions to prevent spread-
ing HIV infection to others. Indeed, the two statutes at issue here are
highly analogous to the statute found to be constitutional in Johnetta.
There, as here, the purpose was to assuage the emotional turmoil
caused by possible exposure to HIV.
It appears equally clear that the statute could not withstand scrutiny
under the more rigorous probable cause plus standard. The mere fact
someone is accused of sexual battery does not mean that the person is
HIV-infected. No probable cause would exist to believe that the defen-
dant had such an infection. Thus, any court deciding to apply the
probable cause plus standard necessarily would strike the statute as un-
constitutional.
However, if the Florida courts follow the present trend in the case
law, they probably will apply the more lenient special needs standard
to the two rape victim statutes-provided one important condition is
met. As noted earlier, the trend evident in the handful of cases is to
apply the special needs standard if the statute is genuinely civil in na-
ture, but to use a probable cause plus standard whenever an AIDS test
is being conducted to search for evidence that will be admitted in a
criminal proceeding. If the state uses either of the rape victim statutes
for the latter purpose, it risks having this evidence suppressed. 37
IV. INVOLUNTARY AIDS TESTING BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
In the section above, this Article discussed the instances in which the
Legislature authorized involuntary AIDS testing after court review. The
Legislature's determination that a court review is necessary is itself in-
structive. The requirement of judicial approval indicates a strong con-
cern that testing not be conducted based on the possibly irrational
whim of interested parties who believe they may have been exposed to
HIV, but conducted only after a neutral magistrate has approved the
procedure. Whatever other defects these statutes have, they at least re-
quire some level of judicial process before testing occurs.
137. Barlow v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987), review
denied and Reporter of Decisions directed not to publish this opinion in the Official Reports
(May 26, 1987) (LEXIS, LEXSEE 236 Cal. Rptr. 134).
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In contrast, the group of statutes discussed in the section below gives
considerable pause. Under these 1990 statutes,3 8 not only is the require-
ment of a court order entirely abandoned, but the decision to conduct
an involuntary AIDS test is given to individual health care providers
whose employees believe they have been exposed to HIV. In effect, the
1990 Legislature placed an interested party-the health care provider-
in much the same position as a neutral court empowered to authorize
an involuntary AIDS test. The statutes discussed below provide for in-
voluntary AIDS tests on individuals accused of exposing health care
workers to the risk of HIV infection.
A. Testing After Significant Exposure of Medical Personnel
One of the 1990 statutes deals with situations in which a health care
worker is exposed to a risk of contracting HIV infection. 13 9 It author-
izes testing-without consent-whenever the worker suffers a signifi-
cant exposure to a person's bodily fluids. 14 Once such a significant
exposure has occurred, other specific conditions must be met before a
test can be conducted without the permission of the person being
tested.
1. The Statutory Conditions
First, the significant exposure must have occurred "during the
course of employment or within the scope of practice.' 41 This phrase
138. See Ch. 90-292, § 3, 1990 Fla. Laws 2319, 2324-26 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 381.609(3)(i)10, 11 (Supp. 1990)).
139. Ch. 90-292, 1990 Fla. Laws 2319, 2324-25 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)10
(Supp. 1990)).
140. Significant exposure is broadly defined as:
1. Exposure to blood or body fluids through needlestick, instruments, or sharps;
2. Exposure of mucous membranes to visible blood or body fluids, to which univer-
sal precautions apply according to the National Centers for Disease Control, includ-
ing, without limitations, the following body fluids:
a. Blood.
b. Semen.
c. Vaginal secretions.
d. Cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF).
e. Synovial fluid.
f. Pleural fluid.
g. Peritoneal fluid.
h. Pericardial fluid.
i. Amniotic fluid.
j. Laboratory specimens that contain HIV (e.g., suspensions of concentrated vi-
rus); or
3. Exposure of skin to visible blood or body fluids, especially when the exposed skin
is chapped, abraded, or afflicted with dermatitis or the contact is prolonged or involv-
ing an extensive area.
FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(c) (Supp. 1990).
141. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.
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is undefined. Courts may be inclined to construe the term in harmony
with analogous workers' compensation law. For workers' compensa-
tion, an injury "arises out of" employment if it occurs within the pe-
riod of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may
be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of em-
ployment or something incidental to those duties. 42
The second statutory condition is that a blood sample must be
taken voluntarily from the person tested for some other purpose. 43 In
other words, blood cannot be forcibly taken. It appears to be irrele-
vant, however, whether the blood was taken before or after the signif-
icant exposure to the health care worker, provided the other statutory
conditions are met.'" Thus, a health care provider could conduct the
involuntary test by taking blood for some other purpose.
The third condition is that the blood sample must have been taken
by "medical personnel.' ' 4 This term includes "a licensed or certified
health care professional; an employee of a health care professional,
health care facility, or blood bank; or a paramedic or emergency med-
ical technician.'"46 Thus, blood taken by some other person would not
satisfy the requirements of the statute.
The fourth condition is that the person tested must refuse to agree
to a voluntary test before an involuntary test can be conducted. The
person must be told Florida law authorizes an HIV test even if con-
sent is refused and requires appropriate counseling for the person
tested.1'4 A refusal and all information about the performance of an
HIV test must be documented; these documents become part of only
the medical worker's records unless the person tested agrees in writing
to include them in his or her own personal medical records. 4 If the
person tested is not available and cannot be located after reasonable
attempts-which must be documented-an HIV test then can be con-
ducted on the available blood sample. 49
The fifth condition is one of the more significant. It provides that
testing cannot occur unless a licensed physician first documents in the
medical records of the health care worker that: 1) there has been a
significant exposure, and 2) in the physician's medical judgment, the
information is medically necessary to determine the course of treat-
142. See Rockhaulers, Inc. v. Davis, 554 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
143. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)10 (Supp. 1990).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.b.
148. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.b.
149. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.b (emphasis added).
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ment for the worker. 50 The last requirement is of special importance
because it describes what the state believes to be the compelling need
for this type of involuntary testing. As is more fully analyzed below,
the question of a compelling need may be a major issue in gauging the
statute's constitutionality.
The sixth condition is that the costs of any HIV testing performed
after a significant exposure must be borne by health care workers or
their employer. This is true whether or not the person tested consents.
Costs assessed against the worker will include only the direct costs of
an initial HIV test. The statute expressly excludes costs for subsequent
testing or for treatment of the patient. 5'
The seventh condition is that medical personnel cannot request an
involuntary test after a significant exposure unless they have tested
negative for HIV within the last six months. The purpose of this re-
quirement is to establish that the personnel are not presently infected
with HIV. Medical personnel who test positive or who have failed to
be tested within the six-month period cannot force an involuntary
HIV test on a patient. 5 2
The final condition is that anyone receiving the results of an HIV
test conducted under this statute must maintain confidentiality both
of the test results and of the identity of the person tested. 5 Inten-
tional violation of this requirement is a second-degree misdemeanor. 54
Because this statute is designed to protect the patient from further dis-
closure, failure to honor the confidentiality requirements could result
in a lawsuit for invasion of privacy, 5  negligence, or some other tort.
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that negligence can be estab-
lished where the evidence shows a violation of any statute designed to
protect a particular class of persons from a particular type of in-
jury. 156
2. Constitutional Analysis
There are at least three potential constitutional defects in the statute
outlined above: possible problems with search and seizure, with due
process, and with privacy rights. First, the statute may authorize an
impermissible search and seizure. As noted in section II above, the
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.c.
152. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)10.d.
153. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)l0.e.
154. Id. § 381.609(6)(b).
155. See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
156. DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973).
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fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures applies even if the object of the search or seizure is not to obtain
evidence of a crime. 57
A significant point is that the testing authorized by this statute is
conducted by private individuals. As a general rule, searches by pri-
vate individuals are not covered by the fourth amendment, provided
the government does not counsel or participate in the search. 58 Tradi-
tionally, this rule has been expressed in terms of actual police conduct
that either encouraged the search or promoted it. 19 Here, however,
the search-a nonconsensual blood test-is conducted entirely by pri-
vate individuals, but is directly and expressly authorized by a state
statute. This may be sufficient governmental involvement to constitute
a form of state action that would implicate the fourth amendment. 160
Even if the statute passes muster under the fourth amendment,
however, it may still be infirm. As noted previously, the courts have
authorized certain noncriminal searches involving blood testing if the
government can show that the test advances a strong enough public
interest. The cases on this question are still too new to discern a defi-
nite legal analysis. However, if the AIDS test is not meant to gather
evidence of a crime, the early cases suggest that the government can
authorize such testing wherever it can demonstrate a special need.' 6'
Theoretically, at least, a special need could be established by showing
that the statute promotes the well-being of health care workers.
However, the question of a special need in the present context has
been considerably narrowed by the Legislature. The statute authorizes
nonconsensual HIV testing only where a physician can certify that
"the information is medically necessary to determine the course of
treatment for the medical personnel."' 62 As noted earlier in this Arti-
cle, 63 there is only one circumstance in which such treatment exists:
preventing HIV infection by a prophylactic drug administered imme-
diately after exposure. For reasons already stated, it is difficult to
157. The federal courts have expressly applied the doctrine in determining the validity of
government-sponsored drug- and alcohol-testing programs that were not part of a criminal in-
vestigation. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
158. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
159. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc); Stapleton v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1969).
160. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
161. See supra notes 33, 35.
162. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)10.b (Supp. 1990).
163. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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imagine that a court-ordered HIV test would be permissible under the
strict letter of the involuntary testing statute, because no such drug
presently exists. 6
The second potential constitutional defect is the possible lack of due
process. An argument can be made for a due process violation be-
cause the State in effect is authorizing a private entity to deprive a
person of constitutional rights without judicial process. Indeed, the
1990 involuntary testing legislation has attempted to abrogate the cen-
turies-old principle of informed consent 65 as well as interests falling
under the right of privacy. All other involuntary testing statutes, with
the exception of the two discussed in this section, require court review
before testing. The Legislature in effect may have delegated a judicial
function to private health care providers by authorizing them to make
decisions that other Florida statutes reserve exclusively for judges,
thus violating due process.
Third, the involuntary testing statute also may violate the right of
privacy,'6 which requires the State to establish a compelling interest
that is advanced through the least intrusive means available. 67 The
compelling need identified in the statute is to obtain information
"medically necessary to determine the course of treatment for the
medical personnel."'' As noted above, this apparently refers to the
need to provide some sort of prophylactic treatment to prevent initial
HIV infection-through an admittedly experimental form of treat-
ment with zidovudine. As already discussed, these facts arguably do
not demonstrate that the state has a compelling need to intrude upon
the privacy rights of patients. 69
Finally, the statute also poses serious problems under the least in-
trusive means prong of privacy analysis because it offers test subjects
no means of challenging a health care provider's decision to conduct
an involuntary test. Court review, for example, might prevent frivo-
lous testing or other unreasonable intrusions upon privacy. But be-
cause there is no provision for independent judicial review or any
other meaningful review process, a serious doubt exists as to whether
this statute is constitutional under the least intrusive means prong of
privacy analysis. This is especially true because the delay caused by
judicial review or other challenges will not result in an inability to
164. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
165. The principle dates at least to the year 1767. See Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860
(K.B. 1767). The Florida statute abrogates the common law principle that informed consent
must precede a medical procedure.
166. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
167. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
168. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)10.b (Supp. 1990).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16, 128-32.
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conduct a meaningful HIV test later, unless the test subject is likely to
flee. If the subject's blood is infected, it will remain so.
B. Testing After Significant Exposure During Medical Emergencies
Another involuntary testing statute was added in 1990 that parallels
the one described immediately above. It, too, is dependent on an ini-
tial significant exposure of health care workers. However, in the case
of medical emergencies, there is no requirement that blood be taken
voluntarily for some other purpose. The statute's silence on this ques-
tion thus appears to authorize even a nonconsensual taking of blood.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the courts actually will con-
strue this statute as authorization for medical personnel to engage in
the potentially macabre practice of wrestling unwilling patients to the
ground in an effort to obtain blood samples.
1. The Statutory Conditions
A number of conditions apply before this statute can be used. Many
of these conditions are similar to those discussed in the subsection
above, but a few conditions are substantially different.
The similar conditions are: 1) the significant exposure must have
occurred "during the course of employment or within the scope of
practice"; 70 2) testing cannot occur unless a licensed physician first
documents in the medical records of the medical personnel that (a)
there has been a significant exposure, and (b) in the physician's medi-
cal judgment, the information is medically necessary to determine the
course of treatment for the medical personnel;' 3) the direct costs of
initial HIV testing-not subsequent testing or treatment-performed
after a significant exposure must be borne by medical personnel or
their employers, regardless of whether or not the patient consents;' 2
4) medical personnel cannot request an involuntary test after a signifi-
cant exposure unless they have tested negative for HIV within the last
six months; 73 and 5) anyone receiving the results of an HIV test con-
170. FLA. STAT. § 381.609(3)(i)11 (Supp. 1990). This phrase is undefined but may be con-
strued in harmony with analogous concepts from workers' compensation law. See supra note 140
and accompanying text.
171. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)11.b. This condition describes what the state believes to be the com-
pelling need for involuntary testing in this context.
172. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)ll.c.
173. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)11.d.
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ducted under this statute must maintain confidentiality both of the
test results and the identity of the test subject. 74
The medical emergency statute differs from the other testing statute
for medical personnel in three ways: 1) significant exposure must have
occurred "while the medical personnel provides emergency medical
treatment [for the medical emergency] 1; 75 2) the test "may be per-
formed only during the course of treatment for the medical emer-
gency" ; 176 and, 3) before the involuntary test can be conducted, the
person to be tested-if conscious-must refuse to agree to a voluntary
test; there is no requirement of first seeking consent from an uncon-
scious patient. 77
2. Constitutional Analysis
The same constitutional defects noted in the preceding subsection
may be present here, but to an even greater extent. To the extent that
this statute authorizes the forcible, nonconsensual removal of blood
from a conscious or unconscious patient, it clearly constitutes a far
more serious invasion of privacy and other constitutional rights. In
effect, the state has authorized health care providers to physically
seize unwilling, conscious persons and draw blood from them. 78
This conclusion is all the more compelling in light of the legal effect
this statute has on the common law and the law of privacy. Under the
guise of creating an exception to informed consent, this particular
statute essentially has turned the law of assault, battery, and negli-
gence on its head. If this statute is applied as written, health care
174. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)l i.e. Intentional violation is a second-degree misdemeanor. Id. §
381.609(6)(b). All information obtained from such testing is exempt from the public records
laws. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)11.e.
175. Id. § 381.609(3)(i)11. The term "emergency medical treatment" also is undefined; it
thus is unclear exactly how broad this exception is. The exception might be construed to include
only life-threatening medical emergencies or it could be broad enough to include any acute medi-
cal condition, whether life-threatening or not. The Legislature quite obviously has delegated the
decision on this question to the individual health care provider, just as it has delegated the deci-
sion to conduct the test at all.
176. Id. These words also are ambiguous, and thus the health care provider is left to decide
what they mean. This language may mean either that the test must be completed during the
emergency or that the test must be commenced during this period, even if it is not ultimately
completed until afterward. The latter construction may be what the Legislature intended, be-
cause HIV testing may take several days to complete.
177. Id. § 381.609(3)(i) 11 .a. There also is no requirement that a conscious test subject be told
that Florida law authorizes an HIV test even if consent is refused, or that Florida law requires
that appropriate counseling be given to the test subject. The refusal (if applicable) and all infor-
mation about the performance of an HIV test must be documented; these documents will only
become a part of the medical personnel's records, unless the test subjects agree in writing to
include them in their own personal medical records. Id.
178. Louisiana has a similar law. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1991).
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workers no longer commit the tort of battery by physically restraining
unwilling patients and forcibly taking blood samples from them. The
patients' right to control their medical destinies is nullified for the
purpose of blood testing, and they are deprived of their right to refuse
a medical procedure they do not desire.
With this statute, the 1990 Legislature has delegated its own coer-
cive powers-the right to seize someone, to deprive them momentarily
of their liberty, and to intrude into their bodies to take blood-to pri-
vate health care providers throughout the State. This almost surely is
state action within the meaning of the privacy amendment, because it
is action taken under direct and express authorization of a state law.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine many violations of privacy more seri-
ous than what this statute purports to authorize. While the State may
have a compelling interest in protecting the health of medical person-
nel, the procedure employed by this statute is exceedingly intrusive.
Indeed, the State will be at pains to demonstrate why it has failed to
require a court review before testing. Court reviews are mandatory in
every involuntary testing statute except the two discussed in this sec-
tion. Yet, as noted above, 179 if a health care worker suffers a signifi-
cant exposure there usually is no good reason to deny adversarial
review of a request for an involuntary test.
For much the same reason, a serious question exists as to whether
this statute meets the requirements of due process. In effect, this stat-
ute provides for no process at all. Without allowing for any judicial
review, the statute authorizes a possible infringement of privacy and
due process rights and of the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure. In some instances, the statute appears to allow for
the forcible drawing of blood from a patient who objects to the proce-
dure. Thus, the statute may violate the constitution by failing to pro-
vide for adequate process.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When it enacted so many statutes authorizing involuntary HIV test-
ing, the Florida Legislature placed Florida in the forefront of states
willing to test the constitutional soundness of this practice.' 80 How-
ever, the precise wording of the statutes indicates that the Legislature
179. See supra text accompanying note I11.
180. The Florida Legislature continues to review still other mandatory HIV testing propos-
als. In 1992, the Legislature will consider proposals to test certain health care workers for HIV
and to restrict the activities of those who test positive. See, e.g., Fla. HB 111 (1992). Such pro-
posals have received renewed interest in light of the transmission of HIV from a South Florida
dentist to his patient, Kimberly Bergalis. See, e.g., WASH. TutEs, Oct. 6, 1991, at A3.
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may not have consistently given adequate thought to the broader legal
issues at stake. For example, the Legislature probably found a firm
constitutional footing in its statutes dealing with testing of prostitutes
and procurers. These statutes appear to meet most, if not all, of the
applicable constitutional criteria.
A somewhat shakier footing is evident in the statute dealing with
testing of sexual battery defendants. While the State almost certainly
has a compelling state interest in such testing, a serious question exists
as to whether the statute meets due process concerns. By authorizing
testing before conviction, the statute in effect assumes that the defen-
dant is guilty before guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
This issue inevitably must be litigated in the courts.
Even more questionable is the statute authorizing court-ordered
testing of persons who injure law officers and emergency workers.
This statute expressly requires that the testing must be necessary to
determine a course of medical treatment. However, an official study
by the State's own health agency suggests that no such medical neces-
sity exists, because no effective treatment exists for preventing infec-
tion after exposure to HIV. Thus, the only purpose served by the
involuntary test is to indicate whether or not an exposure has oc-
curred, and that information alone does not help determine medical
treatment.
Finally, the statutes allowing health care providers to test their pa-
tients involuntarily stand on the least firm constitutional footing.
They share the same defect of the statute noted in the preceding para-
graph. In addition, they delegate to private health care providers the
authority to invade the privacy of a patient by conducting an involun-
tary AIDS test. One of the statutes even tacitly authorizes forcibly
drawing blood for this purpose. These features raise serious due proc-
ess, fourth amendment, and privacy issues that could lead a court to
invalidate the statutes as facially unconstitutional.
However, the methods of analysis used by the courts in these cases
are still quite new. This is partly because involuntary AIDS testing
statutes are a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. Only
a handful of court cases have been reported to date. While these cases
suggest a judicial deference to involuntary testing statutes, it also is
clear that the deference is not without limits. Further, Florida's stat-
utes differ in substantial ways from other state laws upheld by the
courts. Indeed, the possible defects in the Florida statutes appear to
be unique. In any event, the issues outlined in this Article ultimately
must be settled by the courts as they confront the ever-expanding legal
consequences of the AIDS epidemic.
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